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RESPONSE
THE CULTURE OF CAPITAL: COMMENTS ON
CONLEY & O'BARR
GEOFFREY P. MILLER*
In a recent, extraordinarily interesting essay published in this re-
view,' John M. Conley and William O'Barr bring an anthropological per-
spective to bear on the phenomenon of institutional investment in the
United States. These researchers report on field work at nine large pen-
sion funds, including three large state pension funds and six private pen-
sion funds.2 The results of this research are intriguing, not only for the
specific findings which the researchers make, but also for the fact that the
professors conducted the research at all. Anthropological methods have
often been used in studying the cultural systems of faraway peoples, but
Conley and O'Barr truly expand the discipline by bringing this method-
ology to bear on an important segment of the American financial system.
In this Response, I will discuss some of the strengths and weaknesses of
the Conley-O'Barr methodology and suggest possible avenues for further
research.
I.
Prior to the work of Conley and O'Barr, the actual decision-making
processes at pension funds were more or less a "black box" for scholars:
We could observe the outcomes of the processes in the portfolio and vot-
ing decisions of the funds themselves, but our knowledge of how those
decisions were made has heretofore been rudimentary. This study is thus
a major contribution to our knowledge about a vitally important aspect
of our national economic system.
Conley and O'Barr provide particularly interesting evidence about
investment philosophies at major pension funds. They find, for example,
that public funds tend to index while private funds do not,3 and that
public funds tend to take a much more aggressive stance on the issue of
* Kirkland & Ellis Professor, University of Chicago Law School; B.A. 1973, Princeton
University; J.D. 1978, Columbia Law School.
1. John M. Conley & William M. O'Barr, The Culture of Capital. An Anthropological
Investigation of Institutional Investment, 70 N.C. L. REv. 823 (1992).
2. Id. at 826.
3. Id. at 833-34.
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influencing management than do the private funds, which more often ad-
here to the traditional Wall Street Rule of voting with management or
selling out.4 The researchers also draw a connection between the advent
of indexing and the newly aggressive attitude toward management: Once
a fund is indexed, it can no longer sell a stock when dissatisfied with
management's performance; the incentive to influence management then
becomes significantly greater.'
This study represents a pioneering effort to apply anthropological
methodology to the study of the activity of important economic entities
in American society; for that reason it holds an interest that transcends
the information it supplies us about the decision-making process in pen-
sion funds. If the methodology successfully illuminates a subject that
previously was obscure, then it holds promise for many other applica-
tions. Accordingly, there is considerable metatheoretical value in this
work as well. Professors Conley and O'Barr should be commended for
their bold venture into this uncharted area of research.
II.
That said, I want to consider more carefully the possible value of
this kind of research. The important question here is not whether inter-
viewing using the model of anthropological field work produces valuable
results. Such interviews inevitably provide data about the subject under
study. Just as one can never be too thin or too rich, one can never have
too much data. Rather, the key question here is what and how much the
data, once obtained through anthropological field methods, can actually
tell us about the subject under study. All information is good, but some
is better than others.
As professional anthropologists, Conley and O'Barr surely are
aware that special problems may exist in the anthropological investiga-
tion of their own culture-especially with the anthropological investiga-
tion of a sophisticated and technically complex part of our culture such
as institutional investors. A perennial problem in anthropology, as well
as in other fields, is that the researcher may impose his or her own values
on the evidence. This problem assumes a special dimension when one
looks reflectively at one's own culture. This bias occurs because individ-
uals grow up in a culture that possesses a set of attitudes about itself that
is at once complex, powerful, and conflicting. No researcher socialized
4. Id. at 842-46.
5. Id. at 844. This result can be seen as an application of Hirschman's idea about exit
and voice: Once one relinquishes the exit option by indexing, one is increasingly likely to use
voice. ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY 30-54 (1970).
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in this culture can avoid exposure to these self-referential values; no edu-
cated person can avoid opting to a greater or lesser degree for one or
another of the competing self-referential value structures that are avail-
able in the society. Accordingly, when one examines one's own culture,
an inherent danger exists that the results will reflect too much of one's
own pre-conceived values and too little of the evidence itself. As Part III
of this essay discusses, Conley and O'Barr, as perhaps is inevitable when
anthropologists seek to investigate their own cultures, sometimes insert
their own value judgments in their analysis of the evidence.
A related, but somewhat different point concerns the limits on a re-
searcher's vision imposed by the simple fact that a researcher is a mem-
ber of, and therefore immersed in, a particular culture. Again, this
problem of methodology pervades anthropology as well as other fields. It
has a special dimension, however, when one examines one's own culture.
Our high degree of familiarity with our own cultural setting makes us
more likely to be aware of the things of which others in our culture are
aware. Thus, the investigation of our own culture can, in theory at least,
provide a relatively large amount of information relatively quickly. Con-
ley and O'Barr, for example, spent less than thirty days doing this field
research,6 far less than the amount of time that would be required to do
even a minimally adequate survey of a foreign culture. Given their prior
familiarity with our language and cultural setting, this was sufficient time
for them to obtain a large body of information about the milieu they
studied. By the same token, however, the greater familiarity a researcher
has with her own culture also creates the danger that the investigator will
fail to recognize as important data for investigation the sorts of things to
which others in our culture are blind. When we examine our own cul-
ture we have greater information and understanding, but lack the fresh-
ness of view that comes from bringing an alien perspective to bear on the
material. One might wonder whether anthropologists from a nonindus-
trialized, economically unsophisticated culture (if such could be found)
would highlight the same elements of their experience with pension funds
that Conley and O'Barr do.'
Another problem with the study of one's own culture-and particu-
larly with the analysis of a highly sophisticated part of one's culture-is
6. Conley & O'Barr, supra note 1, at 826.
7. I vividly recall being a summer associate at a prestigious Washington, D.C. law firm,
and finding it remarkable that attorneys regularly put on their suit jackets when they went
outside into the steaming heat and took their jackets off when they returned to their air-condi-
tioned offices. I once mentioned to an attorney that the practice seemed strange and received
the bland response, "That's the way it's done." Later, as an attorney in another Washington
firm, I followed the practice without thinking twice.
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that interviewees may not provide complete information to someone
whom they know to be an insider. Interviewees talking to someone
within their culture may have reason to fear that what they say will re-
dound to their disadvantage. If they admit engaging in wrongful behav-
ior they might be sued or prosecuted. Interviewees might be morally
judged by someone whose judgment they fear; one fears condemnation
for contravening the values of one's own culture far more than condem-
nation for violating the values of an alien culture. They may be embar-
rassed or ashamed before someone from their own culture in a way that
they would not in conversation with an outsider. Perhaps not coinciden-
tally, the interviews reported by Conley and O'Barr often seem to take
the form of self-justification of the interviewee's own role and behavior.
As the researchers note, fund managers "continually recreat[ed] the law
in their own image and likeness to support the judgments they ma[de] on
contentious issues."8 The fact that these self-justifications arose repeat-
edly in conversations between the managers and a team of anthropolo-
gists from their own culture may be in part a result of the investigatory
process itself.
Moreover, the fears that the interviewees may have entertained
about being judged from within their own culture based on the informa-
tion provided to the investigators cannot be viewed as irrational. Indeed,
Conley and O'Barr are not loath to make such judgments. They imply
that corporate executives who oppose dialogue with pension fund manag-
ers behave in an irrational and even potentially unprincipled fashion.9
Admittedly, Conley and O'Barr do not direct this judgment at fund man-
agers, except insofar as managers contribute to the hostility by failing to
communicate their actual intentions and interests effectively; this re-
mains, however, a judgment on important participants in the process that
readers of the study could easily interpret as critical and negative. Other
apparently negative judgments seep into the discussion. Conley and
O'Barr suggest that pension funds may be "contributing to the short-
term pressures on American business."'" Later, the researchers opine
that "[t]he problem is that the rhetoric of the short term, along with the
thinking it reflects, has crowded out the alternatives."' I Although they
use a footnote to disavow any judgment on whether short-term economic
pressures are good or bad for the economy, 2 the implication, at least to
me, is that the pension funds may inadvertently be imposing undesirable
8. Conley & O'Barr, supra note 1, at 838.
9. Id. at 845.
10. Id. at 840.
11. Id. at 841.
12. Id at 840 n.28.
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investment strategies on corporate managers. In any event, regardless of
whether Conley and O'Barr pass judgment, their Article, which rightly
will receive attention from those who shape public opinion, can be used
as support by persons who want to encourage a longer-range time hori-
zon for business strategy in the United States.
There is another difficulty with the information flow between inter-
viewees and researchers from the same culture. Interviewees speaking to
someone they know to be from their culture may assume a level of
knowledge and understanding on the part of the researcher that would
not be present if they were speaking to someone whom they knew came
from an alien culture. Thus, they may tend to focus on specifics and
particulars without ever addressing basic questions, not because they
consciously want to censor the basic information, but because they con-
sciously or unconsciously assume that the researcher already knows the
information. Of course, when examining his own culture, the researcher
often does know the information; the point, however, is to draw the infor-
mation out of the interviewee, not the researcher.
This phenomenon also may have been at work in the Conley- O'Barr
study. Many interviewees appear to have assumed a high level of sophis-
tication in financial matters on the part of the researchers. This assump-
tion may well have been rational; Conley and O'Barr signalled their
sophistication by garbing themselves in Brooks Brothers suits instead of
their usual "seedy academic tweeds."13 Perhaps not surprisingly, the in-
terviewees, or many of them, appear to have treated Conley and O'Barr
as insiders in their particular institutional culture. The aura of shared
meanings and understandings is unmistakable even in Conley and
O'Barr's brief quotations from pension fund analysts speaking in the spe-
cialized jargon of their profession. 14
III.
I turn now to some more specific comments.
One of the noteworthy features about this study is that Conley and
O'Barr appear to expect that people in our culture should be able to ex-
plain their behavior in rational terms, and, indeed, to theorize and gener-
alize about their experiences. They find it "surprising" and "disturbing"
that fund managers did not rise above their own personal perspectives
and "articulate a corporate vision."" Dismayed that investment strate-
gies were often shaped by "historical accidents, interpersonal conflicts,
13. Id. at 826.
14. See id. at 835.
15. Id. at 829.
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and political battles," 16 they are "repeatedly struck by the lack of interest
in questioning or analyzing the structures and strategies that had
evolved" in particular funds.17 They find it remarkable that the perspec-
tive of fund managers was not the "bird's-eye view of the historian, man-
agement consultant, or financial analyst."' 8
Conley and O'Barr's collective amazement at the lack of reflection
exhibited by these fund managers is itself perplexing. What did they ex-
pect? Their interviewees were not philosophers, or even management
consultants. Their jobs do not reward deep reflection. Conley and
O'Barr's own data suggest as much. Success in the fund management
business depends, for example, on whether the stocks you picked perform
well, or on whether you handle political relationships around the office
with finesse and discretion. People who flourish in these settings do not
rely on introspection. Why should we be shocked that such people fail to
offer generalized visions of their professional lives? Yet Conley and
O'Barr are apparently shocked, finding it remarkable, for example, that a
fund manager would supply more detail about events that happened after
his arrival at the fund than before, 9 or that he would recount the market
crash of October, 1989, from the standpoint of his own personal exper-
iences on that traumatic day.2°
Equally mystifying is Conley and O'Barr's wonderful, but appar-
ently unintentional, oxymoron that "the work of Adam Smith's invisible
hand was rarely in evidence,"'" which they characterize as "the most
striking finding of the entire project."22 What did they expect, that the
invisible hand would be in evidence? The basis of the "invisible hand"
concept is that people often behave in individually or collectively rational
ways despite the fact that their individual decisions may not be conceived
of or explained in rational terms. Individuals' own descriptions of their
motives and rationales for action do not necessarily jibe with the theory
of action that social scientists might apply looking solely at the results of
behavior. It is hardly surprising that, as Conley and O'Barr note with
apparent dismay, people in the pension fund world were "too busy living
through an event to stop and analyze it."'23 What would be surprising is
16. Id. at 830.
17. Id. at 832.
18. Id. at 828.
19. Id.
20, Id. at 829.
21. Id. at 827.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 828.
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if the findings were otherwise. Most people (other than academics in
tweeds) are too busy living their lives to stop and analyze them.
Conley and O'Barr are coy about whether pension fund managers
actually make decisions on the basis of non-economic factors or whether
they merely talk more about the non-economic factors that go into their
decisions. At one point the researchers caution that they do not mean
"to say that [pension fund managers] do not consider economics, but only
that they choose to talk about other things first and more often." 4 But
they strongly suggest that economics plays a secondary rule in determin-
ing fund strategies.25 The evidence clearly supports the first proposition;
the latter is an inference based on the evidence but which itself requires
further justification.
One rather simple explanation for the Conley-O'Barr results is con-
sistent with an economic theory of behavior. Modem finance and portfo-
lio theories suggest that a fund manager investing in efficient markets,
such as the major stock exchanges, can achieve a high level of efficiency
in her investment strategy merely by picking a sufficiently diversified
portfolio, which does not actually require the holding of a very large
number of stocks.26 This means that it is not necessarily economically
inefficient to consider apparently extraneous factors in determining
which stock to pick, as long as the fund's overall portfolio displays suffi-
cient diversification. There is a vast set of possible diversified portfolios,
all of which would perform within a reasonable band of variance from
the market as a whole. Moreover, if a fund manager is operating in an
efficient market, the choice of any particular stock becomes a matter of
some indifference, aside from its possible impact on the diversification of
the portfolio, because the price at which the stock is bought will reflect
all publicly available information about the stock's underlying value.27
Thus, the apparent lack of explicitly economic reasoning about invest-
ments uncovered in the Conley-O'Barr study may reflect that the fund
managers themselves are largely economically inefficient, or at least su-
perfluous, a possibility at least partially substantiated by the increasing
popularity of indexing in pension fund management strategies.
I also find somewhat mystifying Conley and O'Barr's surprise and
dismay at not finding a "corporate vision" at the pension funds they vis-
24. Id. at 833 (emphasis added).
25. Id.
26. See Meir Statman, How Many Stocks Make a Diversified Portfolio, 22 J. FIN. & QUAN-
TITATIVE ANALYSiS 353, 353-62 (1987).
27. See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency,
70 VA. L. REv. 549, 569-79 (1984).
1993]
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ited.28 They apparently approached the evidence with the presupposition
that there should be a corporate vision. Why? So long as performance is
adequate, who really cares if a fund has a "vision"? One of the virtues of
pension funds may be that they do not have a unified vision, so that a
form of competition among managers within the fund can be enhanced
through the play of competing investment strategies.
Another oddity is Conley and O'Barr's description of the role of
responsibility in the culture of pension fund management. They suggest
that pension fund managers have a preoccupation with displacing re-
sponsibility, which they imply is a disquieting and problematic phenome-
non.29 Much of evidence in their paper itself, however, indicates that
responsibility is allocated in at least some of the funds. Conley and
O'Barr describe one fund manager who is "putting his personal imprint
on the disposition of billions of dollars."3 0 They describe another fund
with a buy-and-hold philosophy as imposing heavy and easily traceable
responsibility on its analysts.3 ' This does not sound like a preoccupation
with displacing responsibility.
Conley and O'Barr point to the growing importance of indexing as a
fund management strategy.32 Indexing, however, does not necessarily
signal a loss of responsibility. Indexing is arguably an excellent invest-
ment strategy for responsible pension fund managers who wish to ensure
that the fund beneficiaries receive a market rate of return without incur-
ring large management fees. Moreover, even in funds adopting indexing
strategies, the managers will be held accountable for deciding to use an
indexing strategy, to use one index rather than another, to utilize or not
to utilize hedging devices, and so on.
Consider also Conley and O'Barr's treatment of short- and long-
term time horizons for investment. Virtually all of their interviewees de-
nied having a short-term investment strategy.33 This seems like a realis-
tic assessment-who better, after all, to have a long-term investment
horizon than a pension fund that is seeking accumulation of value over
the long run? The researchers conclude that these comments are "credi-
ble."34 However, it becomes clear that in using the term "credible" the
researchers do not mean that the comments were necessarily true as a
general description of pension fund strategies, only that they were sin-
28. Conley & O'Barr, supra note 1, at 829.
29. Id. at 834-39.
30. Id. at 830.
31. Id. at 835.
32. Id. at 836-37.
33. Id. at 840-41.
34. Id. at 840.
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cere. In fact the researchers claim to discern under the surface the pres-
ence of powerful short-term influences.35
They hypothesize, for example, that they may have "inadvertently
selected nine funds that do not contribute to the short-term pressures
that corporate management finds so threatening."36 Why use this word
"inadvertent"? It implies that the researchers randomly drew a skewed
sample of funds with long-term horizons out of a population in which
many or even most funds were prey to short-term thinking. Why this
would be a plausible hypothesis, given the improbability of drawing a
sample of nine unusual cases out of a population in which the general
characteristics are different, is difficult to imagine. Would it not be much
more plausible to suppose that the sample was fair and that pension
funds generally are not prey to short-term investment philosophies?
Consider also the researchers' revelation that the investment world
looks at short-term results. They saw few five-year financial reports or
ten-year business plans on the desks of pension fund analysts.37 The re-
searchers concede, of course, that it is necessary to look at short-term
results-any investment analyst who did not examine a company's re-
sults over the short term would not be serving the best interests of the
beneficiaries of the plan. But Conley and O'Barr go on to assert, without
evidence, that all this focus on the short term has "crowded out" long-
term thinking.38 It would, they say, "go against the cultural grain"3 9 for
an analyst to focus on the long term-even though every interviewee re-
ported that the cultural grain, in their firm at least, was focus on the long
term.
The researchers follow this theory of crowding out of the long-term
horizon with the speculation that indexing represents an attempt to over-
come the cultural predisposition to short-term thinking by pre-commit-
ting to a long-term view.' ° But given the hypothesis of Conley and
O'Barr that a corporate culture of short-term thinking exists, why should
there be a turn to indexing? A complex theory of fund decision-making
seems to be implied, in which funds want to focus on the long term but
know that without the pre-commitment to indexing they will likely be
swayed to considering only the short term. Would it not be more plausi-
ble, and parsimonious, to conclude that managers have turned to index-
ing because it is a readily available technique that has been shown over
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 841.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
1993]
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time to be effective? Is it not arguable that the increased use of indexing
substantiates the inference that short-term investment strategies are not,
in fact, dominant at these institutions?
Finally, consider Conley and O'Barr's analysis of the relationship
between pension fund managers and corporate executives on the matter
of proxy voting. The researchers find it "difficult to understand" the ve-
hemence of corporate executives' objections to active proxy voting by
pension funds.41 Why is this so difficult to understand? Pension fund
monitoring represents an active threat to the personal interests of corpo-
rate executives. It is a form of shareholder monitoring with actual clout,
unlike the traditional proxy voting situation in which managers had no
fear of being ousted or even seriously challenged.4" Pension fund proxy
voting is a threat to many corporate executives' personal interests. They
do not like it. What is so surprising?
Conley and O'Barr suggest that there is no valid reason for the ten-
sion between corporate executives and pension funds which pursue an
active proxy voting policy. They paint a picture of a compromise in
which corporate executives stand ready to engage in "dialogue," "con-
versation," and "relationships" with pension fund managers.43 The quid
pro quo on the part of pension fund managers would be to help corporate
executives by, among other things, "thwarting takeover efforts." 44 Con-
ley and O'Barr believe that pension fund managers would be satisfied by
the opportunity to "state their position" even, apparently, if the position
is rejected by corporate executives.45
The researchers' point here appears to be based on a theoretical dis-
position to emphasize the importance of talk and language in the resolu-
tion of social disputes. They are quite frank about the importance they
attribute to the manner in which people talk about things.46 This may be
a valid and fruitful theoretical viewpoint, but if applied too rigidly it cre-
ates the possibility that the researcher will take people's "talk" at face
value even when their actions speak otherwise. One of the advantages-
as well, perhaps, as one of the shortcomings-of the economic approach
to the analysis of behavior is that it usually looks at what people actually
41. Id. at 845.
42. See Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor
Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 811, 820-30 (1992); Bernard S. Black, The Value of Institutional
Investor Monitoring: The Empirical Evidence, 39 UCLA L. REv. 895, 927-31 (1992).
43. Conley & O'Barr, supra note 1, at 845.
44. Id. at 846.
45. Id.
46. See id. at 829 ("[W]e consider the ways in which people describe phenomena to be
reflections of the way they think about them.").
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do, not at what they say they do or would do. People put their money
where their mouth is.
There is reason to suppose that Conley and O'Barr may sometimes
fall into the trap of taking verbal expressions too literally in their analysis
of the relations between pension fund managers and corporate execu-
tives. They assume that because pension fund managers report that they
want to talk and engage in dialogue, the tension between corporate exec-
utives and fund managers would go away if that were done.47 But the
researchers' suggested compromise between fund managers and corpo-
rate executives seems implausible. The fund managers say they want "di-
alogue"; if that were all they wanted they would be satisfied by having a
talk. But if all the fund managers wanted were to talk, then the compro-
mise the researchers advocate would probably have been reached long
ago. Talk is cheap.
The fact is, however, that fund managers with active proxy policies
want more than dialogue-they want influence, and rightly so; they are
fiduciaries for plan beneficiaries whose future income depends in part on
the quality of the managers of the companies in which their plan invests.
An inherent conflict of interest exists between conscientious fund manag-
ers, who want to engage in vigorous monitoring of corporate executives,
and the corporate executives themselves, who want to keep the powers
and perquisites of their jobs without pesky interference from sharehold-
ers. No amount of talk will alter that basic fact.
CONCLUSION
The critique of Conley and O'Barr's work expressed in this Re-
sponse should not obscure the basic merits of their paper. Their applica-
tion of anthropological field methods to the study of major economic
enterprises in our culture is bold and thoroughly commendable. Conley
and O'Barr's pioneering effort, moreover, likely will stimulate further
useful work in this area.
In closing, I might suggest briefly one potentially fruitful direction
that field work methods might take. Anthropological field methods
might be especially effective at disclosing the incentives of actors within
institutions which are currently rather difficult to view from the stand-
point of other analytic methods. Several years ago, Jonathan Macey, Ed-
ward Rubin, David Litt, and I published a study of the governmental
decision-making processes in the United States and Japan with respect to
allowing banks to underwrite distributions of commercial paper.48
47. See id. at 846.
48. David G. Litt et al., Politics, Bureaucracies, and Financial Markets: Bank Entry into
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Speaking with more than forty people closely involved in the decision-
making process in both countries, we employed an interviewing tech-
nique quite similar to that undertaken by Conley and O'Barr. In analyz-
ing the results, we attempted to use the information disclosed by these
interviews as a means to tease out the underlying structure of incentives
of the relevant decision-makers which contributed to the ultimate out-
come. I do not mention this study as any kind of a model, necessarily,
for future research, but it is useful to observe that, in our experience at
least, the interview technique was effective at uncovering information
about incentives which would not have been available by any other
method.
It is to be hoped that Conley and O'Barr's study, with its much
more sophisticated and scientific techniques, will both be influential in its
own right and will stimulate further efforts along similar methodological
lines in a variety of different fields.
Commercial Paper Underwriting in the United States and Japan, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 369
(1990).
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